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Abstract. Using mode1 theoretic forcing we give two interpretations of modal logic with non- 
monotone, semantically defined, consequence operations. The resulting logic is related to the 
theory of updates in databases. 
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‘Contrariwise* continued Tweedledee 
‘if it was so, it might be; 
and if it were so, it would be: 
but as it isn’t, it ain’t. 
That’s logic’ 
L. Carrel:, “ Through the Looking-glass” 
Introduction 
The nonmonotonic onsequence r lations eem to be of interest in various applica- 
tions of artificial intelligence. McDermott and Doyle [S] introduced a general 
framework for such consequence relations. 
In the present paper we investigate a natural interpretation of modal logic over 
databases. This is, in fact, solely ‘faGon de parler’, as the framework is general 
enough to capture quite a good number of cases. 
We introduce, in Section 1, a formalized theory of databases. This theory is a 
variant of one used by Reiter in [lo]. We have, however, to enter into some detail 
since, based on this theory, we define in Section 2 a semantics for the language LM 
(first-order predicate calculus with the modal operator IV). One could say that, in 
fact, we extend the ‘closed-world assumption’ to catch the expressive power of the 
language of modal logic. This involves (at least the way we do this) a set c of 
integrity constraints (in the interpretation of the possibility operator we restrict 
* Partially supported by NSF Grant No. DCR 8411600 and USDA Grant USDA/CSRS/84-CSRS-2- 
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ourselves to the ‘worlds satisfying 2’). As a byproduct we obtain various, semanti- 
cally defined, consequence operators. The idea of restricting semantics to a desirable 
class of models is not new; logicians have used it at least from G6del’s time 
(o-models) and, in the theory of databases, assumptions restricting the form of 
accepted atabases are routinely ac 
At this point let us make a remark ich is our most important point of departure 
for further considerations. Assume initially accept integrity constraints C 
which restrict our admissible databases. Some databases have, in this realm, some 
special properties: for instance, they are maximal, minimal, possess or do not possess 
extensions of a certain type. 
Assume now that C is changed to a Z’, Cc C’. Then the number of ‘worlds’ 
obeying our constraints decreases and some databases which prediously had some 
properties may lose them now! For instance, previously they could possess aproper 
extension, but now they become maximal. Consequently, some facts possible pre- 
viously are not possible now. This results in the nonmonotonicity of the derived 
semantically defined consequence operations. 
In fact, in Section 2 several such operators are introduced: TH, T, TH(R, a), 
T(R, . ), and th. Of these, the operator TH has the nicest properties which seem, 
however, to be too strong. The other operators, T, T(R, 0) and th, are also non- 
monotonic, but less regular. 
Let us note at this point that our consequence operation (hence ‘logic’) is, like 
the auto-epistemic logic of Moore [8] indexical, i.e., context-sensitive. In our case 
the meaning of the modal operator M changes with the theory under consideration; 
while considering the theory C (in the first-order language L), M is interpreted as 
‘possible in an extension satisfying C. . .‘. This is precisely the source of the non- 
monotonicity of our consequence operators. To put the matter in a slightly more 
general context, let us notice that nonmonotonicity appears where semantics is 
restricted. (Note that this phenomenon appears in [8].) 
The semantics which allows us to define these consequence operators is an 
application of the familiar model-theoretic forcing technique of Robinson [ 121 (and 
is also closely connected with Kripke’s interpretation of modal logic). 
In Section 3 we introduce yet another semantics for the language LM. This 
semantics is different from the first one in that we interpret the negation functor 
differently. Whereas in Section 2 negation is interpreted as ‘not . . .‘, in Section 3 
we interpret it as ‘never. . .‘. We prove an interpretation theorem justifying this 
claim. 
Section 4 consists of an extension of the investigations in Section 2 to the modal 
language with two modal operators. One of these, M, has the same interpretation 
as before: ‘possibility in the future’. The other one, m, refers to ‘possible history of 
the database’. As can easily be guessed, this modal language is related to updates 
of the database (cf. Theorem 4.10). 
Throughout his paper we discuss a nonprocedural extended predicate calculus 
(with one or two modalities). The question of the existence of any analogue of 
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Codd’s completeness theorem (i.e., transformation of a nonprocedural calculus to 
a procedural one) is not touched on in this paper. The possibility of the existence 
of such a transformation seems quite unclear to us. The results of Section 4 show 
that any progress in this direction (even for particular Z’s) could influence the 
investigations of the theory of updates. 
We see our paper as a contribution to the application of the methods of logic to 
artificial intelligence. It seems that this direction of research is presently in a fast 
growth phase. 
1. Formalized theory of databases 
A database is a relational system: 
DB=(D,A ,,..., Ak,R ,,..., R,) 
where Al,... , Ak are unary predicates (i.e., subsets of D) and RI, . . . , R, are 
relations on D. 
By the labeling of the system DB we mean an assignment K : (1, e.. , I}+ 
P({l, . . . , k}). K(j) is the set of indices such that Rj c II{Ai 1 i E K(j)}. 
In the sequel we shall assume that every database under consideration possesses 
the labeling. 
The databases (0 9 Al.1 ).. . 9 AL.~, &,t 9 l . l 9 &,I) and (4, &,1 ).. . 9 &.k, 
R 23, l l l 9 R2,J are similar if they possess the same labeling. Labeling is nothing else 
but naming the attributes and is used in the relational database theory to set a 
format for relations (cf. [ 14, Chapter 51). 
Among similar databases we shall discern those which are close. The databases 
DB1 and DB2 are close if and only if D1 = D2 and A 1,1 = A2,1, . . . , Al,k = A2,k. The 
fact that DB1 and DB2 are close intuitively means that they are states of the same 
‘physical’ database. A family of all pairwise close databases i determined by D, a 
choice of A 1, . . . , Ak, and labeling K. This is also equivalent to the fact that relations 
R 1, . . . , RI are contained respectively in U1, . . . , U, where Uj = II{Aj 1 i E K(j)}. 
Given (D, A,, . . . , Ak) and a labeling K, we associate with it a formal language 
L of the first-order predicate calculus which possesses predicate symbols pl, . . . , pl 
(of appropriate arity) to describe relations R, 9 . . . , RI, unary predicates to describe 
A 1, *. . , Ak, and constants a for each a in D. 
If (D,A,,... , Ak) and a labeling K are fixed, then any structure 
@,A 1,-,Ak,R,,-, R,) with Rj c II{Aj 1 i E K(j)} is called admissible. Admiss- 
ible structures correspond to the states of a database when the descriptors and the 
attributes are fixed. 
Letusfix(D,A,,... , Ak) and the labeling K. There is a one-to-one correspondence 
between sets H of atomic formulas satisfying condition (*): 
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and admissible databases. This correspondence is a variant of the closed-world 
assumption (CWA) and is defined as follows: 
DBH=(D,Al ,... 9Ak,Rl ,..., R,) 
where 
Conversely, when DB = (0, Al,. . . , Ak, RI,. . . , RI) is admissible, then the corre- 
sponding H is eJ{HjIICj<~} where ~j={pj(a~,==.,a~)l(a,,n=.,4)ERj}. (This 
construction is due to [lo].) 
H is called amissible whenever DB,.., is admissible. Note that H is a set of at0mi.c 
sentences of our language L. This fact will play a crucial role in our considerations. 
-world assumption @WA)-which our considerations also deal with- 
ughly, described as the assumption that our family of facts represents 
only a part of ‘real database’, i.e., that the real database is determined by some 
admissible H’c H. 
Fixing (0, Al,. . . , Ak) and K determines the language of the database. Since it 
is a first-order language, we have the usual Tarskian satisfaction-relation for it. In 
this paper we shall consider, however, an extended language LM of McDermott and 
Doyle [S]. This is in fact the language of modal logic. We give, in Section 2, a 
formal semantics for this language which generates everal nonmonotone con- 
sequence relations (cf. remarks at the end of [4]). 
Let us point out, though, that the semantics we use for our language L (and LM) 
is much smaller than that used in the general model-theoretic ontext. When 
@,A 1, . - . , Ak) and K are fixed, only the admissible structures will be considered. 
The collection Sat(C) (where C c L) consists of those admissible H for which 
DBH I= Z. 
2. Local forcing 
In this section we shall define a semantics for the logic of [S] and investigate its 
properties. We shall prove that certain derived natural semantic consequence 
operations are nonmonetonic. 
Let LM be the first-order modal language with the set of constants D and types 
(attributes) Al, . . . , Ak, and relational symbols pl, . . . , pl together with the possibil- 
ity opertor 1M. Let C be a set 2f sentences of the language L intended as integrity 
constraints on the databases under consideration. 1Ft is convenient o think about 
C as a collection of dependencies.) Let H be a set of atomic formulas (‘hard facts’) 
and let F be a sentence of L M . We define a ternary relation H !It-_1~ F as follows: 
(1) If F=p(a,, . . . , a,) is an atomic sentence, then 
Hit-SF if and onlyif FcCn(HuX). 
(2) If F=a=b, then 
H Ill-~ F if and only if a is identical with b. 
(3) If F=-G, 
HIIkx F 
(4) If F=G+ 
HIkc F 
1 then 
if and only if not(Wkr G). 
G2, then 
if and only if H III-~ G, or H lll-x G2. 
(5) If F = (Ev)G, then 
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H Ill-z F if and only if H Ill-= G(a) for some constant a. 
(6) If F = MG, then 
H IFS F if and only if H’IIl-s G for some H’ E Sat(X) extending H. 
The remaining connectives &, a, ( ), and S (the dual of M) are treated as 
abbreviations. 
Let us note that clauses (I)-(S) are analogous to those appearing in the inductive 
definition of the satisfaction relation and consequently we have the following 
proposition. 
Proposition 2.1. If FE L (i.e., the possibility operator M does not appear in F) and 
H E Sat(Z), then 
H Ilt--x F if and only if DB,.., + F. 
Proof. By induction on the complexity of F. Cl 
Let us look at some examples in order to see how the relation Ill-= works (in the 
sequel, if it does not lead to confusion we shail write Ill- instead of Ikr). 
Let P) = {a, b, c, d, L}, A = {a, b, c) and B = {d, e). In the language we have just 
one binary relational symbol p (describing a binary relation R) and K( 1) = (2,2}. 
That means that in all our intended interpretations R c A x I?. Let C = (A+ B}. That 
is, we consider the functional dependency: ‘A determines B’. 
We now consider various H’s and investigate their properties. Let H’ be 




Then H’ does not belong to Sat(X). In fact, no extension of H’ satisfies C. 
Let bi = (p(a, d)). H is a formal description of the relation: 
Then Hllt- -p(a, e) 
iPb9 a, Pu4 e)) are 
’ = (p(a, d),p(b, 
admissible xtensions of 
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There are exactly nine maximal elements in Sat(X), of which four are extensions 
of H. 
Define T(H) = {F 1 H Ill- F j. Proposition 2.1 implies the following proposition. 
sitioa 2.2. (a) If H E Sat(Z), then C c T(H). 
(b) IF c n{T(H’) 1 H c H’& H’E Sat(Z)}. 
We also have the following proposition. 
Proposition 2.3. If F = SG, then H Ill- F ifand only ijfor all H’ E Sat(Z), H’ extending 
H, H’ilt- G. 
For the derived connectives SM and MS we have the following characterizations: 
sitisn 2.4. (a) If F = SMG, then H IIt- F if and only if for every H’E Sat(Z) 
extenditig H there exists an H’E Sat(Z) extending H’ such that H”IIl- 6. 
(b) u F = MSG, then H IIt- F if and only if there exists an H’E Sat(Z) extending 
H such that, for all H’E Sat(Z) extending H’, H’lll- G. 
Proof. Both cases follow from Proposition 2.3 and part (6) of the definition of ill-. El 
In the case that all types A,, . . . , Ak are finite, the situation is particularly nice. 
reposition 2.5. Assume that all ,J qes A,, . . . , Ak are finite. 
(a) rf F = SM G, then H III- F if and only iJ for all maximal H’ E Sat(Z) extending 
H, H’lt- G- 
(b) rf F s MSG, then H Ilt- F if and onb if there exists a maximal H’E Sat(X) 
extending 1FI such that H’ Ilt- G. 
Proof. (a)(+): If H forces SMG, then, for all extensions H’ of H in Sat(Z), H’ 
forces MG. Let H’ be a maximal extension of H. Then H’ forces MG and, 
consequently, there exists an H’E Sat(Z) extending H’ such that H’llt- G. By 
maximality of H’, H” = H’. Hence, H’lll- G. 
(+): Follows from Proposition U(a). 
(b) follows from (aj by various De Morgan laws. Cl 
The case of finite types is interesting because then we have always maximal models. 
Whenever H is maximal in Sat(Z) and F is a sentence of the form 
need ta show that whenever Ilt- G. Assume H Ill- 
nsion ‘E Sat(Z), such that 
Ill- 6. 
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Corollas 2.7. If H is maximal in Sat(Z), and F is a sentence of the form G *SG, 
then Hllt- F. 
Proof. By De Morgan rules, using Proposition 2.6. 0 
Corollary 2.8. If H is maximal in Sat(X), then the following are equivalent: 
(i) MFeT(H), 
(ii) FET(H), 
(iii) SF E T(H). 
It should be obvious to the reader that the properties of Proposition 2.6 and 
subsequent corollaries are true only for maximal H in Sat(Z). 
The sets T(H) for H maximal have already some of the desired properties. Define 
now 
TW=nWOIH is maximal in Sat(Z)}. 
This is the first of the semantically defined consequence operations we consider in 
this section. Several others will follow. The operator TH is probably too rtron 
capture the intuition provided by [5]. The reason for this is exactly the regularity 
property in Proposition 2.9(b). As pointed out by Imielinski and shown in Lemma 
2.23, TH(X) is in fact the closure of C by all possible defaults. 
Proposition 2.9. (a) C c TH(Z ). 
(b) For every sentence F of the form MG*G, FE TH(X). 
(c) For every sentence F the following are equivalent: 
(i) MF E TH(Z), 
(ii) FE TH(C), 
(iii) SF E TH(Z). 
Proof. (a) follows from Proposition 2.2(a). 
(b) follows from Proposition 2.6. 
(c) follows from Corollary 2.8. Cl 
Let us note that Proposition 2.9(c) implies that TH(X) is closed under the modrlity 
rule 
SF 
and the default rule 
F 
e shall now deal with the question of monotoinicity of T( Hj an ). 
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Proposidon 2.1 already implies that the collection (T(H) 1 H admissible) is not 
monotonic (in H); H c H’ does not imply T(H) c T( H’). In fact, if we restrict 
ourselves to sentences of a certain form, then the behavior of T( H)‘s is even stranger. 
Let us introduce 
A~(HJ)={FIFEL& HIIt-MF}. 
Notice that, in opposition to [S], we introduce our operator As semantically. The 
set As( H, 2) is the set of assumptions about the world made at point H under 
constraints C (hence the restriction to a single possibility operator in MF). Then 
we have the following proposition. 
Proposition 2.10. rf H c H’, then As( H’, Z) 2 As( H, Z). 
f. Assume FE As( H’, 2). Then H’llt- MF and consequently there exists an 
H”c H’, H” E Sat(C), such that H”IIl- F. But then H” is also an extension of H and 
so H Ilt- ME Hence, FE As( H, 2). Cl 
Proposition 2.10. is valid for a more general class of sets of sentences, namely 
those which are of the form MG (with G possibly in LM - L). 
The sets T(H) for H maximal in Sat(Z) play the role of fixed points. In fact, 
they are exactly the fixed points of the operator As. 
Proposition 2.11. If H is maximal in Sat(Z), then H is a fixed point for As, i.e., 
As(H,X)cT(H). 
roof. Assume that H is maximal in Sat(s). If H Ilt- MF, then there is an extension 
H’ of H, H’ in Sat(Z), such that H’lll- F. By the maximality of H, H’= H. Cl 
We also have the converse. 
Proposition 2.12. If H belongs to Sat(C) and is a jixed point for As, then H is a 
maximal element of Sat(Z). 
Proof. Otherwise there is an H’ in Sat(Z) properly extending H. Pick FE H’- H. 
Then MF E T(H) and so F E As( H, Z). But then FE H, which is a contradiction. 0 
Thus the fixed points of As correspond to maximal H in Sat(X) and our operator 
TH is the intersection of the fixed points. 
One could describe a schema for defining an abstract consequence relation as 
follows: Assume that we have an operator 0 acting on sets of formulas with values 
that are also sets of formulas, and CN(E) is the intersection of fixed points of 0 
Our consequence operation T , as well the classical consequence (by 
ness theorem, the operator 0 is here ’ rovability-in-one-step’) are 
examples of this scheme. Subsequent result shows that, in general, such a con- 
sequence relation is nonmonotonic. 
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We now show that the operator TH : C -TH(Z) is nonmonotonic in C. This 
requires constructing two theories C and 2’ such that C c C’ but TH(Z) $ TH(X). 
Looking at the definition, one immediately sees that the problem is related to creGting 
X1 and & such that & c Z; but with the property that some maximal models of & 
are not maximal as models of lcl. We construct such an example which leads us to 
the desired C and C’. 
Let the language L be unirelational, with one 3-argument relational symbol 
P( 9 9 ) and three types: A = {a}, B = {b}, C = {c, d}. We set Z, = {A-, B}, 
& = {A + B, A + C}. Then there are two maximal elements of Sat(&), namely 
H={p(a, b, c)} and H’={p(a, b, d)} and just one maximal element of Sat(&), 
H”= {p(a, b, c), p(a, b, d)}. Consequently, the sentence p(a, b, c) ti H’ and so it 
does not belong to TH(C,). But it does belong to TH(&). Hence we have proved 
the following proposition. 
Proposition 2.13. The consequence operator TH is nonmonotonic. 
Tarski [13] considered and axiomatized the notion of an abstract consequence 
relation. He considers an abstract language L and his five basic axioms for such an 
operation Cn are as follows: 
(1) ILI- 
(L) C c L*C c Cn(Z). 
(3) C c L*Cn(Cn(Z)) = Cn(X). 
(4) C c L*Cn(Z) = IJ {Cn(Z’) ID= C & 12’1 C w}. 
(5) There exists an F E L such that Cn{ F}) = L. 
Out of these axioms Tarski proves that operation Cn is monotonic. Tarski’s schema 
does not apply in our case, as the operation TH is not total (it is defined only for 
the sets of formulas of L). Nevertheless, we shall prove a version of axiom (3). To 
this end define 
X’=TH(Z)n L. 
We show the following theorem. 
Theorem 2.14. Assume that the types are finite. Then TH(Z’) = TH(2). 
Proof. First of all notice that C c C’. Now 
Z”=TH(Z)nL=n{T(H)IH maximal in Sat(lZ:)}nL 
= n {T(H) n L I H maximal in Sat(Z)} 
=~{Th(D&.,)~H maximal in Sat(E)}. 
The last transformation follows from Prsposition 2.1. 
claim that maximal models in bot 
that we do not claim that Sat(X) and Sat@“) are the same). 
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proof of the claim: (a) Every maximal model of C’ is a maximal model of C. 
Otherwise, there exists an H E Sat(Z’) which is mExima1 for C’ but not maximal 
for 2. But then there exists an H’, H’ E Sat(Z), properly extending F?. We can choose 
N’ to be maximal in Sat@ 1. But then H’ E Sat@‘) ! This contradicts maximality of 
H in Sat@‘). 
(b) Every maximal mode: of C is a maximal model of C’. If H is a maximal 
model of 2, H is also a model of C’. Since C c Z’, every model of C’ is a model 
of C. Consequently, if H can be extended in Sat(X’), then it can also be extended 
in Sat(Z). 
The claim having beer proved, we complete the argument of the theorem. We 
need to show that, for maximal elements H of Sat(X) and Sat@?), the relations 
llt--8 and llt-X8 coincide. This, however, is proved by induction on the complexity of 
F. Once this has been proved, the comparison of the way in which TH(Z) and 
TH(LC’) were defined yields the result. Cl 
The reader has probably realized that during the proof of Proposition 2.13 we 
proved that Tarski’s axiom (4) does not hold for the operator TH. 
In our context it is possible to find an inconsistent heory with a consistent 
supertheory (even in the language L). To see this, let us look at what consistency 
means in our context. The theory C is inconsistent if and only if TH(C) = LM 9 i.e., 
C does not possess amaximal model. If D is infinite, then the fact that C possesses 
models does not guarantee that it possesses maximal ones. As a consequence it is 
possible to construct a pair 2, C’ such that C c C’ and C does not possess amaximal 
model whereas C’ does possess one. 
xample. We sketch an example: C consists of A + B, and 2’ = C u {‘there xist at 
most two pairs’}. If A, B are infinite, then C has no maximal model. C’ possesses 
maximal models. 
One could argue, perhaps, that a different consequence operator, namely 
is more natural. Clearly, T(Z) c TH(Z’). This operator, however, does not have the 
regularity property that F+ F always belongs to it. Consequently, the fixed-point 
property (‘stable set of beliefs’) from Proposition 2.9/c) fails for this operator. Only 
the obvious parts of the equivalences in Proposition 2.9(c) hold, namely 
SFET(C) a FET(Z) a MFET(Z). 
e converse implications need not hold. We give an example to show that we may 
FE T(Z) without FE T(2). In particular, this shows that T(Z) may be 
rly included in 
st let us prove t ing proposition. 
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roposition 2.15. Asspme that all types are finite. Then M F E T(Z) if and only if F 
is forced at all the maximal elements of Sat(X). 
roof. MF E T(Z) implies that every element of Sat(Z) forces ME Hence, every 
maximal element of Sat( 2) forces M F, and so, by Proposition 2.9(c), every maximal 
element of Sat(Z) forces F. 
Conversely, if every maximal element of Sat(Z) forces F, then every H forces 
MF since under our assumptions every H E Sat(E) possesses a maximal extension. 
Thus it is enough to construct E1 and F such that H does not force F, but all 
maximal elements W above H do force 1E An example can be given easily: Let 
C = {A + B}, A = {a, a’}, B = (6, b’}. Then the Ttatement ‘ here exist two tuples’ is 
not forced by { p(a, b)}, but is forced by all the maximal elements of Sat(X). Cl 
The next natural fact about T(X) is stated in the following proposition. 
Proposition 2.16. If 2 E L, then T(Z) is closed under the axioms and rules of the logic 
S 4- 
Proof. Straightforward checking. 0 
The following gives a l-l reduction of TH(.X) to T(Z). 
Propositim 2.17. Assume that all the types are finite. Then, for all F, SMF E T(Z) if 
and only ifFcTH(C). 
Pmof. (*): If SMF E T(Z), then all H in Sat(Z) force SME Then, by the reasoning 
of Proposition 2.5(a), all maximal elements of Sat(Z) force F. Hence, FE TH(X). 
(e): Pick H in Sat(X). Since F belongs to TH(X), H’ill- F for all maximal 
extensions H’ of 
We now prove 
Proposition 2.18. 
H. Use Proposition 2.5(a) again to finish the argument. El 
one of the important facts regarding the operator T. 
The operator T is not monotone. 
Proof. Proposition 2.15 gives us hope to show nonmonotonicity. The idea is to get 
C c 2’ and a sentence F in C’- C such that M - F belongs to T(Z). By Proposition 
2.15, in all maximal H belonging to Sat(X), F must be forced; hence, by Proposition 
2.1 no maximal model of C can be “r model of C’. 
This realized, C and C’ can be easily established: pick A = {a, b, c}, B = {d, e} and 
2={A+B}, 
The maximal models of C satisfy -(B + A) and so - (B + A) belongs to T( 
+ A belongs to T( 
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Notice that the nonmonotonicity of and the interpretability result in Proposi- 
tion 2.17. give another proof of nonmonotonicity of T. 
The following proposition is useful both here and in the later context (Section 4). 
Propsition 2.19. If Sat(Z) # 0, then, for every H in Sat(X), H # 8, there exists an 
H’c H, H’ minimal in Sat(Z), H’ # 0. 
Proof. Choose H’ of least possible cardinality. Cl 
Another nonmonotonic operator, suggested in [3] and related to [2], is defined 
as follows: 
th(X) = n {T(H) 1 H E Sat(X) & H minimal & H # $9). 
As in the case of TH and T, we have the following proposition. 
Proposition 2.20. (a) C c th(C). 
(b) Operator th is nonmonotonic, i.e., there exist lzI c C’ such that th(X) # th(Z’). 
Proof. (a) follows from Proposition 2.1. 
(b) One follows a line of argument similar to Proposition 2.13. Cl 
Another consequence operation we shall investigate here is one determined by a 
set R of defaults (cf. [ll]). A (normal) default is a formula of the form MF+F. 
Proposition 2.9(b) says that the values of the operator TH contain all the defaults. 
This property is clearly not desirable. On the other hand, values of the operator T 
contain only those defaults which are forced in all the admissible databases. Hence 
our subsequent definition: Let R be a set consisting of a certain number of defaults. 
Define now 
T(R,Z)=n{T(H)IHGat(Z)&RcT(H)}. 
The operator T( , ) may seem at first glance slightly superficial. Lemma 2.23 and 
subsequent remarks show that it is however quite natural. 
The following characterizes the closure of H under one default: Let 
’ & H’E Sat(X)} 
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roposition 2.22. H Ill- MF* F if and only if -F E T( H, 2) or H IIt- F. 
roof. (a): H III- M F+ F implies that either III- F or else H III- - 
means that H Ill- S - F which in turn gives -FE T( H, Z). 
(e): If H It- F, then H III- MF*F. If, however, -F is forced always above H, 
then H Ill- -M F and so, again, it forces M F+ F. Cl 
We now discuss the problem of monotonicity of T( R, 2). Let R,,, consist of all 
defaults. 
Lemma 2.23 (Imielinski). T( R,,, , 2) = TH(C). 
Proof. The inclusion 2 was already proved in Proposition 2.21. 
TO show c we need to prove that if H forces all possible defaults, then it is 
maximal. But H forces all defaults exactly when it is closed under the operator As. 
Hence, H is maximal by Proposition 2.12. Cl 
Corollary 2.24. The operator T( , ) is nonmonotone. 
Define now Rmi* = 0. 
Proposition 2.25. T( Rmin 9Z) = T(Z). 
Actually, if we set Rmin equal to the collection of all universally forced defaults, 
we get the same result. 




(b) R c TH(R, Z). 
(c) T(s)= TH(R, 2). 
(d) Whenever MF*F belongs to R, F belongs to TH(R, 2). 
The last property (d) seems to be quite desirable. 
Our remarks show that our operators T and TH are extreme cases of the operator 
T(R, 2). A syntactic characterization of both T( , S) would be of 
interest. 
In a recent proposal to provide a proper semantics for 
logic, Moore [8] introduced the notion of a stable t ugh considered bY 
oore in the propositional context, it may be investigated in our context as well. 
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Iet us recall that C (included in LM) is stable if it satisfies the following three 
conditions: 
(1) C is closed under (classical) propositional provability. 
(2) FEC~SFEC. 
(3) FGcM-FEE. 
From these conditions it immediately follows that 
(4) SFd*Fd, 
(5) M-Fd+FeC. 
A natural question to ask is: are our consequence operations table? In particular 
are T(Z) and TH(B) stable? The answer, it turns out, is ‘no’ as we now show. 
Proposition 2.27. Zf C c L is consistent, hen 
(a) T(Z) satisfies conditions (l), (2), (4), (5); 
(b) If TM(C) # LM, then it satisfies conditions (l), (2), (4), (5). 
Proof. Condition (1): In both cases this condition (and even a stronger one: closure 
under provability in the predicate calculus) is obviously satisfied. 
Condition (2): In the case of operation T it is obvious and in the case of the 
operation TH it follows from Proposition 2.9. 
Condition (4) is again obvious in both cases. 
Condition (5): In the case of operation TH, by Proposition 2.9, M - FE TH(Z) 
iff -FE TH(Z), so if TH(X) # LM, then F ei TH(C). In the case of operation T, if 
M - FE T(X) (i.e., M - F is universally forced), then F cannot belong to T(Z). 
Indeed, if FE T(Z) and M-F E T(Z), pick H forcing M-F. Then there is an H’ 
extending H, N’E Sat(Z), such that H’llt- -F. But W’III- F which is a contra- 
diction. Cl 
As concerns condition (3): 
FtiTH(Z) + M-FETH(Z), 
it is simply false. To see this, note that it is enough to have two maximal conditions 
El and H’, H forcing F and H’ iorcing -F. 
In the case of operation T a similar argument works. 
rein 
n this section we introduce another semantics for the language LM. This semantics 
is related to a different way of treating the negation functor. Whereas in the case 
of local forcing Ill-, it was treated as ‘local’ negation with the intuitive interpretation 
‘not true that. . .‘; now, in the forcing II-, which we introduce below, negation is 
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treated in a global way with the intuitive interpretation as ‘never. . .‘. Consequently, 
we have the following definition: 
(1) If F=pj(aI,.**, a,) is an atomic sentence, then 
Hit-=F if and only if F&n(HuZ). 
(2) If F=a=b, then 
HII-=F if and only if Q is identical to 6. 
(3) If F = -G, then H It-= F if and only if, for all H’ 2 H with H’E Sat(Z), 
not( H’kr G). 
(4) If F=G,vG,,then 
H It-s F if and only if H II-= G, or H II-= G2. 
(5) If F=Gl&G2, then 
H It-= F if and only if H II-= G1 and H It-s G2. 
(6) If F = G+G2, then H II- F if and only if, for all H’z H with H’ in Sat(Z), 
H’II- G, implies H’lt- G2. 
(7) If F = (Ev)G, then H It--H F if and only if, for some constant a, H krG(a). 
(8) If F = MG, then H It-= F if and only if, for some extension H’ of H with 
H’E Sat(Z), H’lt-=G. 
As before, the remaining connectives are treated as abbreviations. 
In order to see how this notion works, let us look at two examples. 
Example 3.1. H ={p(a, b, c), p(u, d, c), p(a, b, e)}, C = {X+ + Y}. Then we have 
not(HIt-p(a, d, e)) but Hll-“~(a, d, e). 
Similarly, we have a second example. 
Example3.2 (Graham [6]). Let H = (p(a, b, c, d), p(e, b,J g)}, C = {A+ B, BD-, C}. 
Then again: 
not(Hlt-p(a, U g)) but HIk-‘-0, U g) 
In fact one can prove that if C is a set of dependencies which, by means of the 
chase procedure (see [6], also [l]), generates a tuple t out of H9 and if p(t) is a 
corresponding formula, then H Il- --p ( t ). 
Our examples how that, in opposition to the forcing Ill-, ‘classically’ equivalent 
formulas need not be simultaneously forced. One reason for this is provided by the 
Interpretation Theorem 3.10 below. 
The next proposition lists basic properties of the global forcing relation It-. 
does not appear in F), 
(b) For no F and HE Sat(Z), H It- F and H It--F. 
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f. (a): By induction on complexity of F. 
(b): Otherwise pick H and F such that H It- F and 
extension H’ of H, H’E Sat(X), H’II- F. But H is su 
diction. 0 
y definition, for no 
which is a contra- 
Corollary 3.4. If F E L and ere is an H’ extending H, H’E Sat(Z), then H does not 
force both F and T 
If there is no H’ in Sat(Z) extending H, then {F 1 H It- F) is con 
Let us introduce: ‘P”(H) = {F 1 H It- F}. We then have the following proposition. 
reposition 3.5. If all the types arefinite and H is maximal in Sat(Z), then C c p(H). 
f. Let C’= Th(DB&, i.e., C’ is the complete theory (in L) of D&.,. Clearly, 
C c 2’. We show, by induction on the complexity of F, that 
HI-F if and only if FEZ’. 
(a) F is atomic, say F = pj(a, , . . . , as). Then HI-F if and only if FE HuC. 
Since H E Sat(C), this is equivalent o FE H. But H is the positive part of the 
diagram of DBH, so DBH I= F, i.e., FE 2’. The converse implication follows from 
the fact that all implications were, in fact, equivalences. 
(b! F=- G. Then H II- F is equivalent o the fact that there is no extension H’ 
of H, H’E Sat(X), which forces G. Since H is maximal, this is equivalent o the 
fact that H itself does not force G. Now we use the inductive assumption. As in 
the previous case, all the implications were equivalences. 
The cases of the other connectives are similar. Cl 
Let TH*(z)=n{T*(H)lH is maximal in Sat(X)}. We have the following 
corollary then. 
Corollary 3.6. C c TH*(ZI). 
Another intuitive support for our interpretation of the negation functor as ‘never’ 
is contained in the following proposition. 
For every H and F, 
v -F; 
(b) Hll--F ifand only ifHIt---‘F. 
e have the following chain of implications. 
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A bit of tedious checking establishes the following result. 
sitioa 3.9. (a) If F is intuitionistically provable [15, p. 4121, then every H in 
Sat(Z) forces F. 
(b) Every formula of the following form is forced by all elements of Sat(X): 
-MF*-F. 
The connection between local forcing Ilt- and global forcing II- is contained in the 
following construction and subsequent theorem. 
We define first an interpretation of LM in LM (in order to make it more intuitive, 
in the first version of LM we use - to denote the negation functor, whereas in the 
second version - is used to denote negation). 
Define an interpretation I( ) as follows: 
(1) I( Pj(a~,.go,a,))=pj(a~,=..,a,)~ 
(2) 1 t-F) = -MI(F). 
(3) I(Fv G)= I(F)v I(G). 
(4) I(F*G)=S(I(F)*I(G)). 
(5) I((Ex)F) = (Ex)I(F). 
(6) I(MF) = MI(F). 
We have the following theorem. 
Theorem 3.10. Let FE LM, C c L. men, for arbitrary admissible H, 
Hit-= F ifand only if HIkr; I(F). 
Proof. By induction on the complexity of F. Comparing the inductive definitions 
of It-, It-, and I, we see that the only nontrivial case is that of F = -G, all the -thers 
being immediate. 
Hence, assume F = -G and, in addition, assume that for G we have 
Hit- G if and only if Hllt- I(G). 
By definition, I(F) = -MI(G). Assume Hit-F. Then HI--G and so, for all H’ 
extending H, H’c Sat(Z), not( H’II- G). 
Consequently, for all H’ extending H, H’E Sat(E), not( H’lt-I( G)), i.e., there is 
no H’ 2 H, H’E Sat(Z), such that H’lll- I(G). Hence, not( 
Hllt--MI(G). 
Similarly, if H Ill- -MI(G), then not( H Ill- IO), i.e., notMere exists an 
extending H, H’E Sat(Z), H’lil- I( 6)). The rest is just organ’s law. 0 
Theorem 3.10 shows the correctness of our intuitive interpretation of - as 
‘never. . .’ in global forcing. 
If the types are finite and is maximal in S ), then there is little difference, 
from the point of view of 
e first need the following lemma. 
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rnraa 3.11. If H is maximal in Sat(C), then H is ‘generic’ in the sense of model- 
theoretic forcing, i.e., for all F, H II- F v -F. 
of. Either H It- -F or there is an H’ extendin H, H’E Sat(Z), such that H’lt- F. 
In the second case, by maximality, H’= H. 0 
Theorem 3.12. Identify - with -. If the types are finite and H is maximal iti Sat@ ), 
then 
HII- F ifand only if Hit-I(F). 
Proof. Again, the case of F = -G is the only one which needs some effort. If H It- -G, 
then no extension H’ of H, H’E Sat(Z), forces G. Consequently, H does not force 
G and so H does not force I(G). By maximality, H ll--I( G). 
The converse implication follows in similar fashion. Cl 
We shall now deal with the problem of monotonicity of TH*( l ) and T*( 0). Both 
are nonmonotone. First we prove the following lemma. 
mma 3.13. Identify - with -. If all the types are$nite and H is maximal in Sat(X), 
then 
HI-F ifand only if HIIt-E 
roof. By induction on the complexity of F. The only case needing some work is, 
as usual, the negation functor. Maximality of H takes care of this. Q 
Corollary 3.14. Identify - with -. 
(a) If H is maximal in Sat(Z), then T(H) = T*( H). 
(b) Ifall the types are jinite, then TH(Z‘) = TH*(X). 
Corollary 3.14(b) has as its immediate consequence the following result. 
l%e operation TH” is nonmonotone. 
The 2; C’ witnessing for TH witness for TH* as well. 0 
The proof of nonmonotonicity of T*( l ), where 
E Sat(JX, 
uses the reduction m ection 2. There we had the reduction 
S ET(C) e FET 
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Here, strange enough, we have another reduction: 
roposition 3.16. Assume all types are jinite. Then: 
SFET*(X) rr-r, &TH*(Z). 
Proof. First, we have to look at what SFE T*(Z) means. This reduces to looking 
at SF E T*(H). A simple translation leads to 
SFE~(H) H -M-FET*(H) 
e for all pairs H’, H” in Sat(C) such that H c H’c H”, 
there is an H”’ in Sat(Z), H”c H”‘, H”‘It- E 
Under the assumption that the types are finite, the rest is just a transformation. Cl 
One can show that, in fact, 
HI-SF H HI---F. 
Let SLM ={SF(Fe LM}.Clearly,SL,c L M. we now prove the last theorem in this 
section. 
Theown 3.17. The consequence operation T*( ) is nonmonotone. 
Proof. Take C c C’ witnessing to nonmonotonicity of TH. Then 2, C’ also witness 
to nonmonotonicity of TH* (Corollary 3.14). Consider T*(X) and T*(X). If T*(Z) c 
T*(Z’), then T*(X) c SLM, T*(Z’) c SLM and now we use the reduction of Corollary 
3.15. We simply show that TH*(Z) c TH*(Z’). Indeed, if FE TH*(X), then, by 
Corollary 3.15, SF E T*(Z); then, by the supposed monotonicity, SF E T*(Z) and., 
again by Corollary 3.15, F eTH*(Z’). Since F was arbitrary, TH*(X)c TH*(ZT’), 
which is a contradiction. Cl 
The argument, with S LM changed to SM LM can serve as an alternative argument 
for the Proposition 2.18. 
We conclude this section discussing the role of the assumption of finite and infinite 
types. If the set of descriptors D is infinite, we still may consider the restrictions 
of D to its finite subsets. Note that such restriction must be chosen carefully since 
we may, if we do this carelessly, ‘kill’ Sat(Z). In fact, Sat(Z) depends on the context 
now and so we write Sat(D, 2) to describe S ) in the substmctures of 
@,A ,, . . . , Ak, U,, . . . , U,) (where LJ,, . . . , ?J, are priate Cartesian products 
of types). 
If C consists of universal formulas only, then, for 
Sat( D”, X). In general, if C is more complicated, say contai 
no inclusion needs take a place. or instance, we can e 
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formula the fact that Al and A2 are of the same cardinality. This fact is not preserved 
neither by subsystems nor extensions. 
. A langn: _:z wit two modal operators and updates 
In this s+%ion we investigate a language with two modal operators, m and M. 
As before (3, Al,. . . , Ak) and the labeling K are fixed. 
Besides the modal functor M (with the interpretation ‘possible in an extension’), 
there is no*: a second modal functor m with the interpretation ‘possible in a 
restriction’. 
The semantics for the functor m is defined as follows: HIII- mF if and only if 
there exists an H’c H, N’E Sat(E), such that H’lll- F. Intuitively, mF means: ‘in 
some smaller state of our database, F is forced’. 
The language Lm,M with both functors may seem, at first glance, bizarre. Yet, as 
we shall see below, it has a natural interpretation when we discuss the updates. 
Let us first discuss the sublanguage L, of Lm,,,, . The forcing for the language L, 
exhibits behavior similar to that for LM . There is, however, one important difference, 
which is a consequence of Proposition 2.19. 
Let TN-(Z) be the set of those formulas of L, which are forced in all the minimal 
nonempty elements of Sat(X). 
position 4.1. If there is a nonempty element of Sat( 2 ), then TH_( C) # L, . 
f. By Proposition 2.19, if there is a nonempty element of Sat(C), then there is 
a nonempty minimal element of Sat(Z), say H. The theory T-(H) = {F E L,,, 1 H III- F} 
is then different from L, and TH_(X) is its subset. Cl 
The fact that below any nonempty element of Sat(Z j there is a minimal nonempty 
element of Sat(Z) implies that the facts corresponding to those proved in Section 
2 for I+,, are usually true for L, as well, and in fact in a stronger form: the assumption 
of the finiteness of types is not needed. 
We shall now discuss the semantics for the language Lm,M. 





mF if and only if there exist an ’ and 
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.3. H IIt- MmF if and only if there exist an H’ and H” both in Sat(C) 
such that H’lll- F and H v H’ c H”. 
Proof. (+: Use the definition. 
(e): H” is the extension of H forcing mE Cl 
ositio and only if there exist 
H’lil- 
sth in Sat(E) such 
Corollary 4.5. MmF (Z) ifand only ifevery maximal ,M in Sat(E) has Q subs 








shall discuss now the updates. Let us start with a few definitions. 
We say that H is an update of H’ of length 1 if both H and H’ belong to 
Sat(Z) and H c H’ or H’c H. 
We say that H is all tipdate of H’ of length n + 1 if and only if there exists 
an H” which is an update of H’ of length n and H is an update of H’ of 
length 1. 
H is an update of H’ if and only if it is an update of H’ of length n for some 
n. 
The sequence (HO,. . . , H,) is an update sequence if, for all i, 0 < i < n, Hi+l 
is an update of Hi of length 1. 
The update sequence is alternating if Hi c Hi+, is equivalent o Hi+1 2 Hi+2 l
Finally, we say that an update sequence witnesses H being an update of H’ 
if and only if the first term of the sequence is H’ and the last one is H. 
Proposition 4.6. If H is an update of H’, then there exists an alternating sequence 
witnessing to this. In fact the shortest witnessing sequence is alternating. 
Let H be a collection of atomic formulas of the form pj( ). &H is the conjunction 
of H. 
roposition 4.7. H It- & H’ if and only if H’ c H. 
For the conjunctions of elementary facts the operator m acts trivially. 
H Ill- m&H’ if and only if there exists an ” in Sat(x) containing 
or the action of the functor on the conjunctions of ele entary facts we bve 
the following proposition. 
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ropositioa 4.9. Hit- M&H’ if and only if there exists an H” in Sat(C) such that 
HvH’cH”. 
We discuss now the relationship between the updates and the logic I+M. 
eorem 4.10E H is an update of H’ of length n if and only if ere exists a sequence 
. . . , a,) of length n consisting of m’s and M’s only such t t H’lll-a, l l . a&H. 
Proof. (*): The witnessing sequence determines the corresponding prefix: when 
it increases, take M; otherwise, take m. 
(c=): From the prefix and the definition of Iit- reconstruct a witnessing 
sequence. Cl 
Proposition 4.6 together with Theorem 4.10 implies the following corollary. 
Corollary 4.11. If H is an update of H’, then there is an n and an alternating sequence 
(a I,---, a,) of m’s and M’s such that H'III-a, . . . a,&H. 
Let Up(H, H’) mean that H is an update of H’. 
Proposition 4.12. Up is an equivalence relation in Sat(Z). 
For an important special case we get the following result. 
Proposition 4.13. If C consists of functional and/ or multivalued dependencies only, 
then, for every H and N’ in Sat(Z), Up(H, H’). In fact, there exists a witnessing 
sequence of length 3. 
For general C’s however, there is no bound of the above sort. One can easily 
construct examples of ‘pathological’ sets C and elements H, H’ of Sat(C) such that 
the shortest witnessing sequence in Sat(Z) for H and H’ is of length >n. 
Semantically defined consequence operations corresponding to those of Sections 
2 and 3 are nonmonotone. The reason for this is simple: for the formulas of the 
sublanguage khl of Lm,M the forcing of Section 4 is identical with that of Section 
2. Consequently, the operator T of Section 2 reduces via identity to the T of this 
section, so that the examples from Section 2 of nonmonotonicity carry over to the 
present context. 
We acknowledge the help of various persons who discussed the subject with us. 
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imultaneously, the way out. 
rough intermediaries), Toma 
to avoid some mistakes. 
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